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Turkey – Quo Vadis

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Key Judgments

The failed coup d'état in Turkey may be the “swan song” of the secular Kemalist state that was founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk at the dawn of the 20th Century. Turkey has been undergoing a process of gradual “de-secularization” since the election of Erdoğan as Prime Minister in 2003, and this process has accelerated since his election as President in 2014. This has been accompanied by a constant erosion of the democratic character of Turkey with the aim of establishing an authoritarian presidential regime under Erdoğan. The “coup” therefore provided him with the opportunity to consolidate his power and to complete the implementation of his plans.

Erdoğan's success in quashing the coup, however, will not enhance the stability of Turkey. The heavy-handed moves against all opposition and potential opposition forces will be a two-edged sword; they are likely to precipitate more opposition to the regime internally, while damaging Turkey's relations with the West, and impose a subsequent economic costs. Like the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th Century, Erdoğan's Turkey is fast becoming, the “Sick Man of Europe”.

The transformation of Turkey is not a domestic Turkish development alone; it is a major regional event that will affect a wide range of regional and international issues. Some of these are already apparent, while others are in a gestation period, and will become apparent, within the next few months. The key short and medium term side-effects of this new phase in the modern history of Turkey are: exacerbation of the internal security situation in Turkey by the addition of the remnants of the Kemalist military and the Islamist regime to the existing conflict between the regime and the PKK; escalation of the war against the Kurds, with spillover into the Kurdish areas of Syria and the Turkish/Kurdish populations in Europe; the possibility that Turkey will abandon the anti-Assad coalition and reach a “separate peace” with Damascus under the auspices of Russia and Iran; increase of the flow of refugees to Europe in order to extort concessions from the EU; Turkish disengagement from the coalition against the “Islamic State” and leveraging its acquiescence of the use of its territory for sorties against the Islamic State to gain further political concessions; friction with the US and Europe due to Turkish demands – that they will find difficult to meet – for extradition of “terrorists” and supporters of the

Gülen movement; and exacerbation of the relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries on the account of Turkey's support of the Muslim Brotherhood opposition in those countries.

Arguably the most dangerous spillover of the transformation of Turkey may be a strategic change in the relations between Turkey and NATO. The shutdown of power to the NATO base in Incirlik, where over fifty B61-3 nuclear bombs with a dial-a-yield ranging from .3 to 170 kilotons are stored, and from where NATO sorties against the Islamic State are staged, was a clear message to the US and NATO. That action has already precipitated a debate in the US regarding the wisdom of continuing to store the nuclear weapons in Turkey. Repetition of such actions will raise unprecedented issues regarding Turkey's credibility as a member of NATO.

The Transformation of Turkey

The secular Turkey that was founded by Atatürk in 1923 has been undergoing a process of gradual erosion since the first Islamist government (the Refah "Welfare) Party", and the predecessor of the current ruling AKP) that ruled for a short period (1996-1997) until it was forced to resign under pressure from the military.

The election of the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood oriented AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as Prime Minister in 2003, and his subsequent election as President in 2014, further eroded the secular character of the Turkish state. Moreover, since his election as president, Erdoğan has steadily whittled away not only Turkey's secularism, but also the democratic character of Turkey, as he has worked towards establishing an authoritarian presidential regime. Indeed, Erdoğan has in the past, expressed his disdain for democracy, except as a vehicle to reach power.

The popular reactions to the coup may have been presented by the regime as support for Erdoğan himself, but a closer look shows that they represented rejection of a return to military intervention in politics and not necessarily wholehearted support of the AKP's policies. Despite the wide support that the AKP enjoys in elections (including the election of Erdoğan as president), public opinion polls place Turkey as one of the countries with the least support (12%-14%) for imposing Shari'a as the law of the land. The affinity of the Turkish population with Europe is also relatively strong, both because of the large Turkish diaspora in Europe (primarily Germany and the Neth-

erlands) and due to the self-image of Turkey as straddling Asia and Europe, not only geographically but culturally and politically.

The above picture, however, reflects a static situation in 2016. Since the AKP gained power, it has invested significant efforts in expanding the Islamic schools and downgrading modern secular education. When the AKP first gained power, Erdoğan declared that the goal of education is to raise “pious generations”. This policy was duly executed by changes in the educational system that first put the religious schools (the Imam-Hatip schools that were originally founded to train Imams or preachers) on a par with the mainstream secular schools, and then even accorded them special privileges. This policy resulted in demonstrations of students in June 2016 who accused the regime of denying them their right to modern education. As time goes on, however, the number of young Turkish citizens who receive only the bare essentials of a modern education in these Islamic schools, has increased, and in the wake of the post-coup crackdown is likely to rise even more. From a generational perspective, Turkey is gradually tossing off its secular identity and reverting to an Islamic identity.

Another indication of the transformation of Turkey is the complex relationship between the Turkish Intelligence (MIT) and subversive organisations in neighboring countries, and the tacit relationships with the “Islamic State”. It is noteworthy that alongside the low percentage of Turks who support imposing Shari’a as the law of the land, the percentage of Turks (November 2015) who were willing to declare full opposition to the Islamic State was 8 percent with 18 percent “not having an opinion”. The collaboration between the Turkish military and the Islamic State, oil deals between the two countries, and the Islamic State’s relatively lenient treatment of captured Turkish citizens, are all indications of this tacit understanding.

The “Coup” and its Aftermath

The coup attempt (14 July) was an ill-organized and even worse-executed action by a relatively small number of troops. Its declared goal was to reinstate secular democracy in Turkey in the spirit of the Kemalist State. The coup failed for a number of reasons: the method of taking control over the radio and TV stations, that was typical of coups in the Middle East in the past, is ineffective in a world of open user generated media; the social media, ironically the same media that the regime has made consistent efforts

to restrict, was instrumental in calling the supporters of the regime to rally against the rebels. But, the most important cause of the failure of the coup was that it did not have the support of any of the secular political parties or – apparently – of the High Command of the Turkish military.

While Turkey has had military coups in the past , all were organized by the leadership of the military through the statutory body of the “National Security Council”, and on the basis of the role of the military enshrined in the Turkish Kemalist regime, to protect the secular character of the country.

The most recent coup attempt was led by a small number of middle and lower level officers, the top military leadership did not take part, and it appears to have been ill-prepared and to have been carried out in haste – a possible indication that it was precipitated by some event. This catalyst could have been preparations by Erdoğan to perform a massive purge of opposition officers in the army . However, there are persistent claims that the decision to act was precipitated by agents of the regime who had infiltrated the opposition within the military and gave the order to act at a time and place that suited the regime. Some reports indicate that the regime received information from Russia on individuals within the military who were in contact with Russia. According to these reports, the thaw in Turkish-Russian relations involved this cooperation and Russia was willing to give up “assets” that it had cultivated to get a greater goal– estrangement between Turkey and NATO.

The swift response of the regime and the almost instantaneous serving of dismissal orders and arrest warrants to tens of thousands of purported “conspirators” and “Gülenists” is not what one would expect from a regime that has just undergone a traumatic coup attempt. Regardless, whether the coup was precipitated by “agents provocateurs” of the regime or not, there is no doubt that the regime was prepared for it.

The Turkish government and Erdoğan personally accused the Turkish opposition figure, Fethullah Gülen - a former confidant of Erdoğan who is in exile in the United States – of having organized the coup . The Turkish judiciary issued a warrant for his arrest on the basis of his being the leader of what the Turkish government names “the Gülenist Terror Organization”. A few days before the coup the Turkish government completed an extradition request that was to be submitted to the United States on the basis that Gülen is involved in “terrorist” activity.

Turkish conspiracy theories, spread by AKP affiliated media, add the assertion that the coup was actually masterminded by the CIA or the Pentagon. Instead of attempting to lower the flames of potential conflict with the West, Erdoğan and Prime Minister Binali Yildirim have warned that any nation that protects Fethullah Gülen (i.e., the US) will be considered “an enemy to Turkey”. It is unlikely that Erdoğan will allow a crisis with the United States to develop over the extradition of Fethullah Gülen. Even if the US administration may be interested in getting rid of the “hot potato” that Gülen represents, the evidence that Turkey may provide to justify such action would not stand up in the US courts.

We find it highly unlikely that Gülen personally was involved in the planning of the coup, though many of his supporters may have been among the rebel soldiers along with secular Kemalist officers. Whether Gülen and his supporters were involved – directly or indirectly - in the coup, the Erdoğan regime will leverage the international support as a democratically elected leader who survived a military coup to accelerate the purge of all levels of Turkish government.

What Drives Erdoğan?

Erdoğan has integrated in his political Weltanschauung¹, since his early political career, a mixture of Muslim Brotherhood (Pan) Islamism, Turkish – even “Turkic” in the sense of expanding beyond Turkey to the Turkish speaking countries of Western Asia - ultra-nationalism, neo-Ottoman imperial aspirations, anti-Western (“colonialist”) ideology, promotion of his own personality cult, and a drive for international personal status that would transcend Turkey.

Erdoğan derives most of his Islamic Weltanschauung from the doctrines of the Muslim Brotherhood. These doctrines call for a process of achieving power first by re-Islamizing society, taking control over the educational system and the social infrastructure, and finally, when the stage of “tamkin” (“capability”) has been reached, achieving political power either through elections or through force. These doctrines do not accept the option of the Islamic regime losing power by election. Erdoğan has expressed in the past his view of democracy as a vehicle for power and not an end to itself or a sacrosanct principle. Erdoğan demonstrates his Muslim Brotherhood iden-

¹ A comprehensive conception or image of the universe and of humanity’s relation to it

tity through his public appearances by raising his hand in the four-finger “rabi’a” gesture that has been identified with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

Erdoğan’s Turkish nationalism is strongly entwined with his “Neo-Ottoman” ambitions. Erdoğan’s personality cult is not unusual in the world of autocratic leaders in the Middle East (or elsewhere). However, since the emergence of the ISIS Caliphate, Erdoğan’s supporters have suggested that the only Muslim leader who may be worthy of the title of Caliph is Erdoğan. Erdoğan himself has not made such a claim, but he apparently has not rejected the persistent suggestions on the part of his supporters in that spirit. Furthermore, the AKP internal propaganda leaves no room for imagination that the goal is the “resurrection” of the Ottoman empire, and that Erdoğan is the man worthy of the post of Caliph. This however may imply that the “Caliphate” applies only to Turkey. Erdoğan does not limit his claim for leadership to Turkey but extends it to the population of ethnic Turks in Central Asia. This is not unique in Turkish politics; secular Turkish leaders have also highlighted Turkey’s interests in those countries and invested in influence in them.

Another indication of Erdoğan’s “Neo-Ottoman” aspirations is his view of important landmark events in the history of the Ottoman Empire, such as the anniversary of the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 (when the Byzantines lost the war against the Turks and paved the way for Turkish control of the Anatolian peninsula), May 29th 1453 (the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans), and other allusions to Ottoman history.

To all these facets of Erdoğan’s political-psychological makeup, one must add two more intertwined drivers: a fascination with Nazi Germany and a deep-rooted anti-Semitism. Erdoğan has expressed in the past an appreciation of the tactics of the Nazi regime. During his student years he promoted the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” and produced a play “Mas-Com-Ya” (“Free Masons, Communists and Jews”), that describes the “conspiracy” of the three to take over Turkey. Erdoğan has also frequently expressed his admiration of the anti-Semitic and anti-Secular thinker, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek whose “Büyük Doğu” (“Great East”) ideology was the main inspiration for the foundation of the Islamist terror organization IBDA-C. translated to Turkish “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion” and Henry Ford’s “The International Jew” and wrote a political program that called for cleansing the “Turkish homeland” from all non-Muslim and non-Turkish elements – particularly the Jews and the Dönmes (“crypto-Jews who, according to Turk-

ish anti-Semitic narratives live publicly as Muslims but continue to maintain their Judaism). Erdoğan's promotions through the organs of the AKP of virulent Nazi-like anti-Semitic narratives, his own anti-Semitic statements, and his reference to the model of "a presidential system with a unitary state" that was implemented in Hitler's Germany, as an example of the political system he proposes for Turkey, are all indicative of his disdain for democracy as a model of government and not merely a vehicle to attain power.

Erdoğan's "Gleichschaltung"

In the light of the above, the "coup" – regardless of its initiators and the reasons for its failure – appears to be Erdoğan's "Kristallnacht" or the burning of the Reichstag. Erdoğan has seized the opportunity to deal a final blow to the fragile democracy of Turkey and to remove the final vestiges of secular Kemalist Turkey.

The purges in the wake of the "coup" are the final blow to Kemalist Turkey. The depth, extent and scale of the purges are unprecedented in the history of democratically elected governments with the exception of Nazi Germany. They are reminiscent of the Nazi regime's policy of "Gleichschaltung" – reorganization of the body politics in all its aspects. Hence, the purge encompasses not only the organs through which the state exerts physical control – the military, the police, the judiciary – but also the institutions that represent the intellectual heritage and Weltanschauung of the "Ancien (secular Kemalist) Régime" – the universities, schools, research centers and media. The very course of the "coup" demonstrates that the AKP regime has already established near full control over the military and the police. Since these are the only institutions that could have taken power, there exists at this stage no serious challenge to the next phases in Erdoğan's playbook – change of the secular constitution established by Atta Turk, introducing Shari'a law into the Turkish legal code, crackdown on secularists in political parties, in the educational system and in the media and eventually full rollback of the secular state.

In his first speech after the coup, Erdoğan already declared his intention to stage a purge of the "terrorists", "Gülenists" and "traitors" within the country. On the top of the regime's target list are the military, the police, the judicial system, the educational system, and the media. About 25,000 have been arrested or detained, about half of them military personnel, including

over 300 high ranking officers with the rank of General. These arrests and detentions have, in essence, removed about a third of the Turkish military's high command. In addition to the military, more than 8,000 judges, police officers and journalists were arrested.

In addition to the arrests, the regime began immediately to implement an unprecedented purge of other branches of government and of Turkey's civil society. All together some 70,000 officials were dismissed. About half of them were teachers, and university professors and the rest from government ministries, banks, the stock exchange and other financial institutions. The first civil institution that the regime is targeting for crackdown is the judiciary. An emergency meeting of the Judges and Prosecutors High Council was held hours after the coup was quashed and announced the dismissal of 2,745 judges across the country. About 30 judges were arrested. The council also terminated the membership of five of its members after the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor's Office's decision to arrest them. Forty-eight members of the Council of State (the highest administrative court that numbers 156 members) and 140 Constitutional Court members have been served warrants, detained or arrested. Warrants were issued for tens of journalists and media outlets – newspapers and TV and radio stations had their licenses revoked. However, the wave of arrests has not been restricted to officials and military officers; tens of schoolchildren between the ages of 15-18 were arrested and charged with treason and an unknown number of medical doctors were also arrested. On the other hand, in a bid to assuage the European and American criticism on the arrests, Erdoğan has declared that he will drop the charges against hundreds of Turkish citizens who are accused of insulting the president.

What Next Inside Turkey?

The next stage of the crackdown is likely to focus on opposition members of Parliament and the secular media – the latter already being the subject of severe persecution over the last years. There will probably be further waves of arrests and dismissals; the ease by which citizens may report to the authorities about their “Gülenist” neighbors or colleagues will enhance the state of fear that typifies authoritarian regimes. The international media highlighted the perception that all parts of the Turkish body politic have expressed their support of Erdoğan. In fact, the positions expressed were pointedly against the intervention of the military in politics and not neces-

sarily support of Erdoğan. The new stage of repression of civil rights will not enjoy popularity.

Erdoğan apparently believes that he has abundant levers to make sure nobody outside of Turkey stands in his way. He will not be deterred by criticism from Washington or Europe. Erdoğan apparently feels that he has abundant levers to deter the international community from interfering in his plans:

- Manipulation of the arrests and death sentences by offering pardons and reinstatements of dismissed academics in return for their collaboration and in return for Western non-criticism of his domestic policies. Capital punishment was taken off the books only a few years ago to satisfy the European demands as part of the process of accession to the EU. However, since the EU will probably slow down the process anyway, the regime is likely to reinstate capital punishment (“by popular demand”) and then Erdoğan may approve or withhold his approval of executions as leverage.
- Abandoning or suspending the agreement with the EU and threatening to send waves of refugees. The regime will claim that the EU did not keep its end of the bargain since it is censuring Turkey for violation of civil rights and stopping the process of accession to the EU that was the heart of the agreement.
- Pressure on NATO by turning the power off and on Incirlik and threatening the safety of nuclear weapons. An attempt to take over the base and then negotiate over the removal of the weapons should not be ruled out.
- Lowering the profile of CT collaboration and of the war on the Islamic State.
- Raising the rhetoric around Fethullah Gülen in order to induce the US to try to lower the flames through conciliatory steps.

Erdoğan’s heavy-handed measures may, however, turn out to be counter-productive for him. The alienation of large sectors of Turkish society – secularists, Gülenists, Kurds and even AKP members who will be purged – is likely to create a large group of disenfranchised and bitter members of the former elite. Some of these will flee the country to evade arrest; others will go underground and form opposition parties and even military opposition groups. This development is almost inevitable. The large number of purged

high-level military officers who have lost everything will create a common cause against the regime. Their expertise will enable them to form underground military organisations. Such a development is likely to develop into a terrorist war in Turkey that may spill over into the Turkish diaspora in Europe.

It is likely that Erdoğan will leverage his new advantage and temporary immunity to international condemnation to escalate the campaign against the Kurds. This will not be limited to the terrorist branch of the PKK and its affiliates, but will probably include Kurdish political figures and organizations that are deemed to favor Kurdish autonomy or independence. Escalation of the war against the Kurds may spill over into the Kurdish areas of Syria and Iraq and result in Turkish military action in these areas.

Regional and International Consequences

The transformation of Turkey as described above is not a domestic development, that can be delinked from the strategic map of the region; it is a major regional event that will have an effect on a wide range of regional and international issues. Some of these are already discernible whereas others are in a period of gestation, and will come to fruition within the following half-year or more.

Might Turkey Change its Syrian Policy?

The developments in Turkey will have a direct effect on the Syrian civil war. Erdoğan already began in an effort to repair the relations with Russia before the coup. But if he wants to restore the relations to the level that Russia would counter-balance the deterioration in relations with the West, he will have to end his support to the Syrian Islamist opposition. One potential “swap” would be to offer an end to his support of the Syrian opposition in return for Russian support of Turkey’s position in regards to the Syrian Kurds; to pressure the Democratic Union Party (PYD), in the Kurdish area in Syria (Rojava), to abstain from further moves to create a continuous territory under its control along the Turkish border by linking its Eastern enclave with its Western one, around Arfin.

Ending support for the Syrian opposition would not go down easily with Erdoğan’s Islamist power base. To offset its impact Erdoğan would have to

burnish his Islamist credentials and intensify his championing of Sunni Islamist causes and groups, like the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. Under these circumstances, any public recognition of the normalization of relations with Israel will be avoided. The Saudi months-long effort to bring about a Turkish-Egyptian reconciliation in order to forge a Sunni bloc against Iran, which has been rather fruitless thus far, will certainly fail.

Signs of a possible shift in Turkey's Syria policy had emerged already before the attempted coup. In recent weeks there were reports about indirect talks between Turkey and the Assad regime. On July 13, Turkey's Prime Minister Binali Yildirim hinted that just as Turkey had normalized relations with Russia and Israel, it wants to normalize its relations with Syria ("for the sake of the struggle against terrorism") and to develop relations also with Iraq and the rest of the Mediterranean and Black Sea littoral states. While immediately after his statement, he denied that Turkey had changed its position on Syria, it may be seen as a trial balloon to gauge the reactions of the regional and international actors. However, according to various reports, Algeria had mediated secret talks between Syria and Turkey in June and another round of talks was held in early July in Tehran. According to the report, in the secret negotiations, Turkey wanted Syria to cease its support for the PKK and to help round up its military leaders, and expressed its willingness to cooperate with Syria on combating the Islamic State. For its part, the Assad regime wants Turkey to close the border to Islamist terrorists, to stop its support for rebels in Aleppo and other cities in the Syrian North, and to suspend its financial and political support to the Syrian National Coalition. Syria also wants Turkey to keep many of the Syrian refugees, which Syria considers as being anti-regime or families of Syrian rebels.

A Turkish decision to reconcile with Assad will thus constitute a major regional strategic shift, a major victory for Iran and Russia, and a major setback for Saudi Arabia and for the Western governments seeking Assad's departure and a political transition. There are several good tactical reasons why Turkey may want to mend fences with Assad: the Syrian civil war has flooded Turkey with Syrian refugees and has exposed her to major terror attacks which she is incapable of stopping; it has facilitated the development of a PKK affiliated semi-autonomous Kurdish entity in Northern Syria on the Turkish border and that Kurdish entity has become an asset for the West in combating the Islamic State.

If Turkey decides to end the war, the Syrian political opposition and rebel groups will no longer be allowed to be based in and operate from Turkey,

and receive arms and supplies through Turkey. This would effectively end the Sunni insurgency in North –Western Syria (Aleppo and Idlib areas). The Sunni insurgency in Southern Syria, which is supplied through Jordan, would go on for a while, but the end of the insurgency in the north-west would allow the Assad regime and its Iranian and Hezbollah backers to concentrate their efforts in the South, and it would not take them long to crush the insurgency there too.

Turkey and the West

It is likely that Erdoğan's measures will place Turkey's request for accession into the EU on the backburner for at least a year. This will also affect Turkey's demand from the EU for visa waivers for Turkish citizens, and potentially also roll back agreements that have already been reached between Turkey and the EU.

Turkey will now prepare lists of "terrorists" and supporters of the Gülen movement for extradition. However, the crackdown on Turkish civil society and on the judiciary will make it impossible for European countries to extradite people to a country where they will clearly not be given a fair trial or may be tortured. This too will exacerbate the friction between Turkey and the West.

A more severe possibility would be spillover of the Turkish internal situation into the European theatre. This could be precipitated by the regime's mobilization of its supporters in Europe to attack so-called "Gülenists" - mainly in the Netherlands and Germany. The escalation of the war against the Kurds also bears potential for increasing waves of Kurdish refugees from Turkey and northern Syria into Europe and revival of Kurdish (PKK and others) terrorism against Turkish targets outside of Turkey.

Foreign investment will be scared away by the rise of authoritarianism, the decline of the state of institutions and of the rule of law, the upheaval in the judiciary, and uncertainty concerning regulatory stability. The repression will drive groups opposed to Erdoğan to go underground, and perhaps to resort to violence. This will happen just when the national security institutions, which have to handle those groups, are destabilized and weakened by the purges. More coup attempts or terror attacks can therefore be expected. Arguably the most dangerous spillover of the transformation of Turkey may

be a strategic change in the relations between Turkey and NATO. The shut-down of power to the NATO base of Incirlik, where over fifty B61-3 nuclear bombs with a dial-a-yield ranging from .3 to 170 kilotons are stored and from where the NATO sorties against the Islamic State are staged, was a clear message to the US and NATO. That action has already precipitated a debate in the US regarding the wisdom of continuing to store the nuclear weapons in Turkey. Repetition of such actions will raise unprecedented issues regarding Turkey's credibility as a member of NATO. The Turkish control of access to Incirlik will also affect the war against the "Islamic State". It is likely that Turkey will now make cooperation with the US (and use of Incirlik) in the war against the "Islamic State" contingent on at least tacit acceptance of the crackdown of the opposition.

The Arabs and Israel

The new stage in Turkey's history will also affect Ankara's relations with its Arab neighbors. Even a "flirt" by Turkey with the Assad regime will strain his relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, and even with Qatar--that has provided Erdoğan's regime with support, both directly and through its media arm, Al-Jazirah. Independently of the Syrian issue, Turkey's relations with the Arab countries are liable to be further strained by Erdoğan's overt support of the Muslim Brotherhood that is viewed in Egypt and the Gulf as a "terrorist" organisation.

The coup in Turkey came a short time after the signing of the agreement between Israel and Turkey that put an end to the dispute between the two countries over the Marmara Affair. This agreement, however, was seen as a step towards semi-normalization of the relations between the two countries and not a staged of renewed friendship. Israel, however, will find it difficult to side with Turkey, at a time when Turkey is coming under pressure and criticism by the US and Europe. Therefore, the recent agreement will not bring about any real progress in the Israeli-Turkish relations.

Conclusions

The aftermath of the "coup" in Turkey is not a "crisis" that will ebb after a period of time; it is a true watershed event in the history of modern Turkey with significant regional and international effects.

Erdoğan's success in quashing the coup will not enhance the stability of Turkey. The heavy-handed moves against all opposition or potential opposition may turn out to be a two-edged sword; they are likely to precipitate more opposition to the regime, damage Turkey's relations with the West, and cause subsequent economic costs. Like the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th Century, Erdoğan's Turkey is fast becoming the "Sick Man of Europe".

The key short and medium term side-effects of the new phase in the modern history of Turkey are: exacerbation of the internal security situation in Turkey by the addition of the remnants of the Kemalist military and the Islamist regime to the existing conflict between the regime and the PKK; escalation of the war against the Kurds, with spillover into the Kurdish areas of Syria and the Turkish/Kurdish populations in Europe; the possibility that Turkey will abandon the anti-Assad coalition and reach a "separate peace" with Damascus under the auspices of Russia and Iran; increase of the flow of refugees to Europe in order to extort concessions from the EU; Turkish disengagement from the coalition against the "Islamic State" and leveraging its acquiescence of the use of its territory for sorties against the Islamic State to gain further political concessions; friction with the US and Europe due to Turkish demands – that they will find difficult to meet – for extradition of "terrorists" and supporters of the Gülen movement; and exacerbation of the relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries on the account of Turkey's support of the Muslim Brotherhood opposition in those countries.

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